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Overture: homage to a moral exemplar
Early in the Second World War, under the increasingly 
dangerous Nazi occupation of Holland, Professor Cleveringa 
stood up, and with what seems to me today remarkable 
bravery, spoke out against the brutal, racist policies of the 
occupiers and their oppressive interference in the professional, 
academic, and everyday life of Dutch men and women.  
He offered an heroic model of resistance, and he suffered the 
consequences. From what I understand, Cleveringa did not 
need to speak out. He could have chosen to live like so many 
others a life of compliant silence and passive collaboration.  
In most cases of military occupation by the Nazi forces, the 
vast majority of citizens went along with the heinous policies 
of the occupiers in order to protect themselves and their loved 
ones from the more immediate threat to their way of life.  
Even though they may have held thoughts of silent opposition, 
people complied, and many actively collaborated, seeking to 
get what they could from the morally compromised ethos. 
Open resistance was there, yet it only became substantial as 
it became clear that the German conquerors were in military 
trouble and might lose the war. This stark context makes even 
more impressive Cleveringa’s (and his Leiden colleagues’, for  
he was not alone) rebellious action at such an early point in 
the occupation.
For this reason, I am especially honored to deliver the 
Cleveringa Lecture - because it honors a rare academic leader 
who put the aspirations for justice, goodness and higher ethical 
standards ahead of personal safety, professional advancement 
and just getting on with one’s life.
In my recent book, What Really Matters: Living a Moral Life 
Amidst Uncertainty and Danger (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 
2006), I include a picture by Pablo Picasso, entitled “The Head 
of a Medical Student.” (Figure 1). This picture’s distinguishing 
attribute is an African mask-like head with one eye closed 
and the other wide open. This juxtaposition of an open eye 
and closed eye creates the sense of tension so characteristic of 
medical students. One eye is open to the world of pain and 
suffering; the other shut tight, perhaps to protect the self from 
too much adversity, or perhaps to serve the self-interest of the 
budding physician. Professor Cleveringa’s portrait would have 
to present both eyes open. For he clearly saw that the form 
of moral experience imposed by the German conquerors was 
unacceptable, unliveable because it undercut the ethical ideals 
that make a university one of society’s truly crucial moral 
domains. 
Figure 1 “The Head of a Medical Student.” by Pablo Picasso
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In his magisterial two-part biography of Adolf Hitler, Ian 
Kershaw demonstrates in monumental detail that the 
Holocaust of the Jews was the result of the willingness of 
ordinary Germans to go along with the Nazis’ murderously 
anti-Semitic policies as long as their own lives, their families, 
their incomes, the things they personally held dear were 
protected from the feared Soviet threat. The Jews, Kershaw 
sadly concludes, simply didn’t mean enough to ordinary 
Germans for them to risk what mattered much more to them 
by opposing Nazi policies. The famous Dutch willingness to 
protect the Jews aside, we might well ask why did Cleveringa 
stand up and speak out in defiance of Nazi laws and 
procedures, knowing what was likely to be the consequence? 
The answer to this disturbing question could only have been 
answered by Cleveringa himself. Yet, in this public lecture I will 
offer one possible answer. Cleveringa, for me, stands as an icon 
of the quest many of us undertake to somehow live a moral 
life in the midst of local worlds of moral experience that we 
find inadequate, oppressive, unjust, unbearable. That lifelong 
quest turns on our ethical, aesthetic and religious aspirations 
for remaking the world. Those aspirations I regard as just 
as fundamental to our existential condition as the dangers, 
uncertainties and things that matter most in our daily lives. 
Cleveringa was more heroic than most of us; but in a way  
I will later define as anti-heroic, we all engage this issue. 
Now, because one of those ethical/aesthetic/religious 
aspirations involves caregiving, I will turn this opening gambit 
in a direction more appropriate to my own expertise: health 
catastrophes, suffering and medicine. Let there be no mistake, 
however. I see Cleveringa’s example as a kind of caregiving,  
and therefore directly relevant for tonight’s subject.
First movement: things as they are
I will first describe the current situation and the problems 
we face in the field of healthcare. Aside from skilled nursing, 
rehabilitation efforts by physical therapists and occupational 
therapists, and the practical assistance of social workers 
and home health aides, caregiving, especially for victims of 
health catastrophes and end-stage conditions, has relatively 
little to do with medicine. Caregiving is primarily a matter 
of families, close friends, and the afflicted individuals 
themselves. It is they who struggle with the activities of daily 
living such as bathing, feeding, toileting, dressing, and who 
spend the long hours of working around, through and with 
pain, functional limitations, memory loss, agitation, and 
the many other difficult realities of the most serious health 
problems.
To illustrate this point, I draw on my personal experience as 
the caregiver for my wife, Joan Kleinman, who is suffering 
from a severe neurodegenerative disorder that has affected her 
memory, motor functions, and restricted her independence. 
I wake her up in the morning, and assist her in toileting, 
bathing, and dressing. I make us breakfast and help her feed 
herself. I assist her in walking, placing her in a chair and in 
our car. I am with her nearly all the time, protecting her from 
injuring herself because she can neither see nor navigate safely 
either on the street or in our own home. I read the newspaper 
and books to her, explain stories on the TV, and select music 
for her to listen to, and make telephone calls for her to our 
children and grandchildren. I prepare lunch and dinner and 
help her eat; and I do all the things required to get her ready 
to go to bed at night. Of course, our children, my mother, 
my brother, and others call and help when they are able, and 
several times a week we are assisted by a professional home 
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healthcare helper who does the wash, cooks several meals and 
spends the day time hours with Joan.
Joan herself does as much as she is able to do. She rarely 
complains and, with the exception of occasional agitation that 
is beyond her control, she struggles to enjoy life, and usually 
succeeds in doing so. In this and several even more crucial 
ways she is her own caregiver. She keeps up on her part in our 
conversations, emotional exchanges, and moral relationship. 
While it is greatly disturbing to witness a once elegant, 
intellectually lively and highly independent companion of 
over four decades deteriorate, our emotional reactions from 
frustration and anger to sadness have been cushioned and 
sublimated by our work, the long rhythm of our days together, 
and most of all by the support of family and close friends.  
That “support” is as much a part of caregiving as all the 
mundane practices I have listed, and amounts to moral 
solidarity with our struggle and concern and responsibility  
for us. Without it, it is hard to imagine how either Joan or  
I would be able to endure and go forward.
I give you this highly personal sketch because it is the best 
I can do to illustrate what caregiving entails, and why it 
is so crucial to all of our lives and the human condition 
more generally. Caregiving, as illustrated by our case, is 
about acknowledgment, concern, affirmation, assistance, 
responsibility, solidarity, and all the emotional and practical 
acts that enable life. Caregiving also includes what happens 
when hope and consolation are abandoned, when theodicy 
is ended, and when all there is to do is to be present with 
the sufferer, sharing his/her suffering by simply and usually 
silently just being there. There is a painting that once upon a 
time hung in Children’s Hospital in Boston; the sun is rising, 
an exhausted pediatrician, in the pre-antibiotic era, holds the 
hand of a child who has just passed through crisis and lysis of 
a fever. This too is caregiving. Examine these three paintings 
of Rembrandt - ‘Saskia in Bed’, ‘Dr. Bueno’ and ‘The Jewish 
Bride’ (Figures 2, 3, and 4) - they also represent caregiving: as 
interpersonal experience, as the concern and compassion of 
the healer, and, in a larger sense, as love.
So, what is the status of caregiving for health catastrophes and 
other serious conditions in medicine today? While medical 
educators will claim that caregiving is still central to what 
it means to be a physician and will point to courses and 
practitioners who teach the art of caregiving to students,  
the on-the-ground reality is much more uncertain and fragile. 
Most physicians, outside of primary care providers, do little 
in the way of hands-on caregiving. Hospice doctors are 
caregivers; and physicians who routinely deal with end-of-life, 
such as oncologists and cardiologists and nephrologists and 
gerontologists, are surrounded by caregiving opportunities, 
Figure 2 ‘Saskia in Bed’ by Rembrandt
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yet few participate in the nitty-gritty of caregiving - leaving 
the practical assistance and emotional tasks to nurses, social 
workers and the patient and his/her network of support. 
In medical school, the curriculum in both the basic science 
and clinical clerkship years places the great emphasis on 
understanding disease processes and high technology 
treatments. The illness experience gets less and less pedagogic 
attention as the student progresses from classroom to inpatient 
ward and clinic. And in the broader system of healthcare, 
students can all-too-readily discern that medicine largely 
leaves caregiving to others. Those others include nurses whose 
professional science has made caregiving a central element 
of knowledge production and training. Yet, this knowledge is 
largely unavailable to young physicians and medical students. 
Its association with a lower status profession perhaps even 
provides it with something of a stigmatized status. It is notable 
that caregiving still has a strong gender bias. Most caregivers 
are women. And historically and crossculturally this is even 
more impressively true. What is particularly true of our time 
and especially in my own society is that the structure of 
service delivery and the funding of health services work to 
discourage professionals from the art of caregiving and can in 
fact undermine the practitioner’s efforts. Part of the mistrust 
of doctors is the growing sense that they seem uninterested in 
caregiving. 
Recognizing this tenuous and contested status of the 
knowledge and practice of caregiving in medicine, the late, 
great American physician-educator Walsh McDermott once 
proposed, perhaps tongue-in-cheek, that the caregiving and 
technological roles of the doctor might be separated, and the 
former dropped from medicine as a burdensome and poorly 
cultivated anachronism. Almost no educators would agree with 
McDermott’s provocative suggestion - and even he probably 
would have withdrawn it from consideration if he thought it 
would be taken seriously, rather than to stimulate discussion 
of how to strengthen caregiving in the curriculum - but if 
we are willing to honestly look into the actual situation of 
caregiving in today’s medicine, we must come away with the 
Figure 3 ‘Dr. Bueno’
by Rembrandt
Figure 4 ‘The Jewish Bride’ by Rembrandt
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accumulating sense that caregiving is at best inadequately 
taught and supported among students and physicians, and 
at worst is a hollow skill that has been emptied of content, 
commitment and competence. It is a vestigial component of 
medical training and practice that occupies an ambiguous and 
uncertain position in the profession, as marginal as clinical 
experience is in the age of “evidence-based” practice, and is in 
danger of becoming a platitude that is taught hypocritically 
and learned only to be unlearned as part of the hidden 
curriculum in medical student and residency education.
If this conclusion strikes the listener as overly bleak and 
unjustified, ask yourself the question what serious effort 
has been made in determining and operationalizing the 
knowledge basis needed to provide good care? What time has 
been allotted for acquiring this skill in medical school and 
residency training? Do, for example, students get placed in 
caregiving situations, say, in the homes of victims of health 
catastrophes, so that they actually experience caregiving? What 
provisions have been made to evaluate the doctor’s skills in 
caregiving? And, overall, how has caregiving been developed as 
a crucial academic subject requiring theory-building, empirical 
research, and applied science contributions? How often is 
assessment of caregiving skills taken as seriously as assessment 
of basic and clinical science knowledge? Has medicine - under 
the great influence of global political economic, bureaucratic, 
technological, and cultural change - turned its back on 
the medical art and the thousands of years of humanistic 
approaches to medical practice cross culturally? Has the hugely 
powerful biotechnology-medical-industrial complex, the 
over bureaucratized health care system with its stark regime 
of efficiency on behalf of the god of cost-containment and 
its new culture of audit, and the global cultural revolution 
of hyperindividualistic consumerism and Internet-spread 
marketing of the latest drugs and surgical procedures 
separated medicine from caregiving? Does the experience of 
competent caregiving mold doctors’ careers nearly as much as 
the evidence of clinical science? Are medicine and caregiving 
incompatible to the point of divorce?
Second movement: experience
In What Really Matters: Living a Moral Life Amidst 
Uncertainty and Danger, I describe the local moral worlds of 
patients and physicians that have become ordinary realities 
in our time. These realities define what it means to be human 
amidst the dangers and uncertainties that are the existential 
universals in our shared human condition. So, what does the 
present situation tell us about this condition today, which 
my Harvard forebear William James referred to as “genuine 
reality”. 
For the medical anthropologist, people everywhere live in the 
flow of interpersonal interactions in local worlds - networks, 
families, institutions, communities. Experience is that flow 
of words, movements and emotions between us. Experience 
seen this way is not only local, it is inherently moral. 
Why so? Because living our lives is about animating and 
enacting values. We are constantly experiencing, negotiating, 
defending, and just living values. Those lived values are the 
things that are personally and collectively at stake for us: for 
example, status, reputation, resources, connections, religious 
and cultural practices, and so on.
Moral experience is the flow of things at stake in local worlds. 
Our own moral life may be consistent with or in conflict with 
our local worlds of experience. We can collaborate with such 
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worlds or seek to resist and transcend them by our aspiration 
for ethical commitment.
Now, think of the clinic, the hospital, the HMO, the medical 
school, or the family setting of caregiving for victims of health 
catastrophes as just such local worlds of moral experience. 
What can we say about them that relates directly to tonight’s 
topic.
First, those local worlds are deeply affected by the massive 
economic, political and cultural forces of our globalized era. 
One particularly egregious example is the hyping of claims 
by the biotechnology industry, by medical researchers, and by 
specialist practitioners of how much we know and can control 
in health and disease. The economic incentives for hyping are 
not difficult to appreciate. The cultural sources of hyping affect 
not only the medical industrial complex, but also the financial 
management industry, the insurance industry and the national 
and international policy domains. Much more is claimed 
than is actually known. It is often said that half of all cancers 
are curable, for example, but as social psychologists have 
shown, just turn it the other way around - half of all cancers 
are incurable - and excessive optimism is replaced by soberer 
reflections. Most chronic diseases can only be managed, not 
cured, and their sequelae in long-term, disabling consequences 
such as blindness, amputation, and kidney failure in diabetes 
cannot be controlled either. In my own specialty of psychiatry, 
for all the important advances of neuroscience, we still don’t 
possess a single biological test for routine clinical use to 
diagnose depressive or anxiety disorders or schizophrenia. 
And while the drug treatment of serious depression has 
improved, still 35% of patients are treatment resistant and the 
placebo effect itself in most clinical trials accounts for a 45% 
improvement over against 65% for antidepressants - nowhere 
near the huge claims made by the pharmaceutical companies. 
Prognosis not only for mental health conditions, but for most 
chronic disorders remains difficult and uncertain.
Now add to this picture all those things in the natural world - 
like forest fires and brushfires, earthquakes, floods, droughts, 
and climate change - that affect hundreds of millions of 
people, and the idea that we know, can predict, and can control 
events looks highly suspicious. Political violence, financial 
crises, outbreaks of food contamination, major accidents, and 
the dozens of other dangers that are a regular part of our lives 
only clarify more fully that the very idea of risk management 
is overblown and unsupported by the evidence. In fact, danger 
- natural and social - has been, and will for the foreseeable 
future continue to be, inadequately understood, poorly 
predicted, mostly uncontrolled, and largely unpreventable. 
That is to say, danger and uncertainty are an ordinary element 
in every day living everywhere - more notably among the poor, 
but affecting all of us.
This is a picture of a huge discrepancy in our local worlds 
between the dominant moral reality that encourages 
exaggeration of knowledge and treatment and the genuine 
reality of our existential condition. The implications of this 
reality gap for health and medicine are simply enormous. 
Patients are misled by the media’s hyping into highly distorted 
views of what medicine can do, and health professionals and 
students are also the victims of routine hyping in the medical 
literature. It is understandable that researchers and medical 
research administrators will participate in this process in 
order to secure greater public and private funding, but it is 
nonetheless deeply troubling that the scientific enterprise itself 
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has been distorted by global economic and cultural interests. 
Add to this the corrosive, yet accurate popular idea that 
conflict of interest is rampant in medicine, and the widespread 
suspicion that health professionals are more interested in 
their own financial condition than in the conditions of their 
patients, and we all can understand why distrust of physicians 
has skyrocketed almost everywhere while the status and 
prestige of the profession has fallen.
But I want you to think of this tension in a local setting like 
a research lab or clinic. I think of the pressure on young 
researchers and young clinicians to collaborate with established 
practices as they write grant applications, explain research 
projects to the media or elicit informed consent from patients. 
Think of this as cultural influence on the way prognosis is 
explained to patients being offered a new medication or surgical 
procedure in a clinical trial or for treatment. What about young 
clinicians or students who challenge the conventional approach?
Now, consider societies in the twenty-first century where moral 
worlds are also ethnic and immigrant worlds. Intercultural 
communication across these worlds makes the moral concerns 
I am raising even more strident and complex. Here medical 
anthropology has a particular advantage in advancing 
intercultural communication concerning the moral issues 
surrounding health, illness, health care, and public health. 
Think of female genital cutting and all the other sources of 
crosscultural conflict and misunderstanding in the clinic and 
the community. But medical anthropology too can promise 
more than it can deliver. Many claims on behalf of cultural 
competence in health care are examples that hyping is not 
limited to biomedicine.
In the late 90s, I participated in a small global health meeting 
of researchers and funders to which I was invited to present 
a proposal for support of global mental health programs for 
the treatment of depressive and anxiety disorders, and the 
prevention of suicide. When the group’s discussion came 
to the topic of AIDS in Africa and other poor societies, the 
discussants uniformly supported the then dominant position 
that only prevention, not treatment could be provided to 
patients in such societies. I tried to challenge this conclusion, 
invoking social justice and human rights arguments. I was 
dismissed as naïve, romantic and wrongheaded. And when 
the time came for me to present the mental health agenda, 
those criticisms soured the group’s reception of my proposal 
so that it went unsupported. The lesson has been learned 
by each of us: moral experience is risky. Go against the tide 
of values and sentiments and you risk personal criticism 
and defeat for your own projects. Which brings us back to 
Professor Cleveringa. Heroism carries a price only a few are 
willing to pay.
The best that may be available for most of us is what, for 
want of a better word, I will call anti-heroism. Anti-heroic 
actions are ones that critique and resist the moral status quo 
by perturbing and disturbing our local world. They signal 
disaffection and raise questions in others. They indirectly 
challenge the taken-for-granted. They run against the moral 
grain. In place of actions that aim to change the world, 
anti-heroic practices aim to create a space for alternatives 
where critical self-reflection can thrive. In such a space, local 
protagonists can search for ways to live a moral life in spite of 
the shortcomings of the local moral world. And that quest for 
living one’s own moral life can be generalized as an aspiration 
for ethical positions that offer an alternative vision of what 
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the local world might look like with respect to social justice 
and integrity and other trans-local values. 
Medical practice is one setting where the anti-heroic can be, 
and has been, realized. W.H.R. Rivers, the early twentieth 
century British anthropologist-psychiatrist, introduced a 
humanistic, ethnographic form of psychotherapy into the 
medical care of traumatized officers during the First World 
War. That psychotherapy provided Sigfried Sassoon, the highly 
decorated yet anti-war poet, with a protected place to come 
to terms with his own rebellion against the carnage. Sassoon 
returned to the front without giving up his critical political 
views; Rivers, in turn, became an anti-war critic devoting the 
remainder of his life to political transformation on behalf of 
pacifism, workers’ rights, and the legitimacy of psychological 
trauma as an honorable and compensable medical condition. 
Rivers’ antiheroism did not change his world, yet he opened 
a moral space for many others to rethink their commitments 
and rework their practices in service of more availing ends 
and against the grain of the dominant values of that era: 
colonialism, racism, and jingoistic nationalism. 
For patients and families faced with health catastrophes and 
the most serious chronic medical conditions, the experience of 
suffering is not just a personal one, but is strongly influenced 
by cultural and historical changes in the illness meanings, 
socialization, and self processes that contribute to moral 
life being distinctive in different eras and societies. Faced 
with a threat of pain, disfigurement, loss of function, and 
serious disability, individuals and families reframe the moral 
experience of suffering by remaking meanings, emotions and 
values via ethical, religious and aesthetic activities. The same 
holds for physicians. Faced with their own or their patients’s 
suffering, physicians rework meanings, emotions and values 
in their professional and personal lives. Ethical, religious and 
aesthetic practices contribute to professional caregiving by 
transforming the experience of the caregiver.
Much of the great art of the bloody 20th century chartered 
the growing disillusionment of communities and their fear 
of a progressive loss of their humanness as a result of wars, 
oppressive political systems, and deadening bureaucracies. 
Hence Abstract Expressionism depicted a dehumanized world, 
including the world of hospitals and clinics. Over the long run 
of Western civilization the very idea of suffering has changed, 
reflecting a progressive sense that suffering had lost its former 
religious and ethical meanings and had become utterly 
trivialized as an unnecessary experience that could simply 
be prevented or remedied with drugs. Advertisements for 
pharmaceuticals build on this central message that suffering 
holds no value and need not be experienced. This is a far 
cry from the sense of suffering in earlier times as a central 
struggle of the soul. Contemporary institutional structures in 
medicine further impede the religious, ethical and aesthetic 
processes that remake suffering by remaking meanings, values 
and emotions. The bureaucratic structures and financial 
constraints of care undermine the art of medicine and interfere 
with the ancient task of caregiving.
Third movement: caregiving and the medical 
humanities
So what is caregiving for the physician and what is the 
knowledge base for it to be practiced and taught? Boiling down 
a variety of studies of the frail elderly, dementia and terminal 
conditions, for example, we can say that caregiving begins 
with the clinical ethical act of acknowledging the situation of 
the sufferer, affirming their efforts and those of family and 
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friends to respond to pain and impairment, and demonstrating 
emotional and moral solidarity with those efforts. It moves on 
to involve the physician in pain management, symptom relief, 
treatment of intercurrent diseases (e.g., depressive disorder), 
and judicious management of the use of pertinent technology 
and control of unnecessary or futile interventions. It includes 
working within a network of advisors (legal, financial, 
religious), co-health professionals (physical therapists, 
occupational therapists, nurses, social workers, and home 
health care assistants), and family and network caregivers. It 
often involves advising on appropriate use of hospital and 
home health care technology. And it means spending real time 
with patients, empathically listening to their illness narratives, 
eliciting and responding to their explanatory models, and 
engaging the psychosocial coping processes involved in 
enduring or ending life. Managing the process of dying and 
being a presence at death and assisting, to the extent it is 
wanted, with bereavement are also part of caregiving. These 
involve moral; affective; and meaning-making activities that we 
have learned much more about in recent years. And included 
here is self management of the physician’s own emotional and 
moral responses which may at times require debriefing by 
co-professionals, as well as attention to the practitioner’s own 
ethical, religious and aesthetic needs. 
Some of the knowledge required for professional caregiving 
comes from hospice programs, psychiatry, psychology, 
gerontology, nursing, and social work. But in this lecture I 
want to emphasize the role of the medical humanities. The 
medical humanities bundle together a disparate assortment 
of disciplines and programs: medical anthropology, medical 
sociology and medical history, medical ethics, pastoral 
counseling and religious studies, and programs as diverse as 
narratives and the arts in medical education. I do not believe 
that any single discipline or program holds the answers. Rather 
after four decades of teaching medical students I am convinced 
that, however it is done, it is the contribution of the medical 
humanities to two educational objectives that matters.
The first objective is preparing students cognitively, affectively 
and morally to undertake the tasks I have sketched. This means 
teaching students how to listen, be with, emotionally respond 
to, and communicate with patients and their networks. It 
means learning how to interpret patient and family stories. It 
means learning how to explain and interpret treatment and 
prognosis. It means training doctors to use their personalities, 
emotions, cognitions and values therapeutically, It should go 
hand-in-glove with actual experiences of caregiving in patients’ 
homes and institutions, not just in year one of medical training 
but throughout undergraduate and postgraduate medical 
training. And it means that student doctors must be evaluated 
for these competencies.
The second objective is of a somewhat different sort. Here 
the medical humanities aim to foster critical self-reflection. 
They do so, in my experience, by opening and authorizing a 
space for reflection, criticism and experimentation. That space 
of critical reflection is first present in the medical student’s 
curriculum. Keeping it available and legitimated in the clinical 
training of the resident is a substantial challenge. But once 
again by legitimating the medical humanities in postgraduate 
training this can happen. Continuing medical education in 
medical humanities for the practitioner holds out the promise 
of keeping that space open during the career trajectory of 
doctors.
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The habit of critical self-reflection enables the individual 
practitioner as well as groups of practitioners to interpret, 
interrogate and evaluate the local moral worlds of practice 
in the clinic, hospital and public health domains. Out of that 
effort comes the anti-heroism I mentioned earlier. Where the 
local world of practice is seen to be morally problematic or 
unacceptable, perturbing and disturbing that ethos enables 
others to come together over criticism of the moral issues 
in practice and in the quest or aspiration for ethically more 
availing practice. 
Critical reflection on obstacles to performing the art of 
medicine might lead to interrogation of the health financing 
system, which in my own country is a leading barrier to make 
available the “time” required for responding to patient requests 
with full and understandable answers. The analytic light of 
criticism may focus on the sources of physician conflict of 
interest and patient/family distrust, including ethnic and 
class issues that lead to health disparities. But there are a 
number of other obstacles to the art of caregiving from the 
local culture of a clinical department to the interference of 
the bureaucratic culture of audit via excessive paperwork and 
the routinization of clinical behaviors. Again, using my own 
society as an example, fear of medical-legal suits can interfere 
with practice of the art of medicine. And the list goes on. The 
purpose of instilling critical reflections in clinicians is to lead 
them to interpret what are the locally conflicting or impeding 
structures. 
Critical reflection empowers practitioners not just to identify 
the problems but to attempt to resist and correct them. This 
crucial clinical responsibility does not develop on account 
of a single medical humanities course, but requires an entire 
curriculum of medical humanities experiences to counteract 
the disabling qualities of medical education. In essence, the 
practitioner has to come to feel that the art of caregiving is as 
much at stake as the science and technology of diagnosis and 
treatment. And, in my view, that means reform of the very 
culture of contemporary biomedicine.
At the level of leadership and at the level of the ordinary 
practitioner, the profession needs to reclaim and revivify 
the art of healing, clinical experience, and caregiving as 
fundamental to the profession. Medical school deans and 
department chairs similarly need to reaffirm via educational 
and practice reform that caregiving is central to pedagogy 
and the paideia of the physician. This commitment needs to 
be reflected in the way students and residents are tested. The 
local worlds of medicine need to make clear in every way 
that caregiving is what matters most along with science and 
technology. Short of doing these things, the profession and 
its hospitals and schools need to seriously consider Walsh 
McDermott’s Swiftian choice: divorce the art of medicine and 
give up caregiving to the other helping professions including 
alternative and complementary medicine. No one can imagine 
that happening when it is offered as a free choice. But I insist 
this is what is actually happening today on the ground, as the 
economics of health services, the political economy of research, 
the culture of bureaucracy, and moral worlds of medical 
schools and clinical institutions have effectively removed 
caregiving from what matters most in medicine. And to stop 
this social process of atrophy, we need to do all the things I 
have mentioned along with providing the medical humanities 
with the place in the curriculum and the resources they need to 
reclaim and revivify caregiving in the profession. 
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Fourth movement: remaking the moral world of 
medicine: the example of global health 
That the situation though dire is not hopeless is illustrated 
by one new development on the broad stage of health that is 
at one-and-the-same time technologically, managerially and 
morally promising: namely, global health. There is a huge 
societal-wide social movement in my own country and others 
among students, faculty and practitioners to create a new kind 
of global health that is at the cutting edge of science, that is 
technologically mature, that also is committed to the highest 
level of clinical practice, that makes use of the latest managerial 
strategies to implement scaled-up programs, and that responds 
to the global ethical issues that are crucial to globalization such 
as social justice, equity, and in the simplest and bluntest terms, 
bringing good into the world of the poorest. The refocusing of 
attention is on disease as part of social suffering. 
Social suffering is a term employed to break down the barriers 
across the separate fields of social and health policy, and 
to picture health (and medicine) as part of the large-scale 
political, economic, and cultural changes of our era that 
have widened the gap between rich and poor, contributed 
to emerging infectious diseases, worsened social and mental 
health problems, and at the very same time rocked health 
services and shaken health financing. Social suffering 
emphasizes the importance of poverty and health disparities 
across populations. It also draws attention to the fact that some 
problems are actually worsened by social and health policies. 
Among the leaders of this field are several of my former 
medical anthropology M.D.-Ph.D. students, who started 
what is now a leading NGO: Partners in Health. PIH spends 
virtually all its resources on community projects amongst the 
poorest Haitian, Peruvian, Rwandan, Malawian and Siberian 
populations. It has been widely commended by the experts 
and the media for providing locally organized and culturally 
oriented services that include high technology care, first-rate 
clinical services and an emphasis as well on caregiving to 
patients with AIDS and MDRTB. The caregiving is not an 
afterthought or an appendage but an integral part of services 
that have shown outstanding outcome data at the same 
time that they have become training grounds for reforming 
local worlds of patients and practitioners, and building an 
indigenous generation of leaders. These anthropologist-
physicians have become icons of doctors who have dedicated 
their lives to providing high technology treatment and 
humane caregiving to the sickest and poorest patients. And 
their commitment has attracted thousands of students and 
practitioners to global health as an ethical movement that 
prioritizes an approach to those without resources as advocacy 
for and practice of both social justice and caregiving.
The new global health differs from the old international health 
(and the still older tropical health) in a number of ways; but 
particularly by placing the care of the individual patient at the 
same level of priority as prevention for the population. This 
is a transvaluation of values that combines the values of social 
medicine with those of public health. By emphasizing local 
lay caregiving networks as an integral element in community 
health programs, technology, clinical expertise, prevention, and 
community ownership of programs are integrated in a critical 
clinical practice that builds clinics, roads, and essential drug 
programs and also incorporates local approaches to caregiving. 
I believe it is this critical practice that attracts such broad 
interest to global health and to Partners in Health in particular.
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How have these medical anthropologists, and others like 
them, succeeded? And what lessons can be learned from these 
successes in global health that can be translated into ordinary 
health care in your country and mine? In my view their 
success turns on four factors that are of relevance: 1) they have 
criticized the status quo of local worlds at home and abroad, 
demanding social justice and public service; 2) they have 
modeled a form of collective caregiving based on caregiving of 
individuals in great distress and generalized to the population 
level; 3) they have mobilized young men and women, the 
media, the funding agencies, and governments to contribute 
to local programs; and 4) they have drawn on critical self-
reflection and the anti-heroic in those worlds to recruit local 
leaders. 
I believe we can apply these very same approaches to the 
reform of clinical medicine in medical schools, hospitals and 
clinics in rich societies like yours and mine. I have emphasized 
the medical humanities in my talk, but really all of us need 
to get involved, to be called to the ethical roots of what it 
means to be a doctor for those who have experienced the 
most serious, hopeless and therefore most human of health 
conditions. At bottom, that is an ethical call back to the roots 
of what is (and has long been) at stake for physicians. I believe 
this moral movement has the chance to remake medicine and 
medical education. And this is why I am arguing in this lecture 
that if we are in agreement that biomedicine and caregiving 
must not divorce, then we must advocate on moral grounds 
for the art of medicine and for caregiving for others in great 
need even more broadly as a crucial component of the human 
endeavor, as Cleveringa himself demonstrated. 
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